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A historically  fragmented  U.S.  health  care  system,  where  care  has been  delivered  by  multiple
providers  with  little  or no  coordination,  has  led  to  increasing  issues  with  access,  cost,  and
quality.  The  Affordable  Care  Act  included  provisions  to use Medicare,  the  U.S.  near  universal
public coverage  program  for older  adults,  to broadly  implement  Accountable  Care  Organi-
zation  (ACO)  models  with  a triple  aim  of improving  the experience  of  care,  the health  of
populations,  and  reducing  per  capita  costs.  Private  payers  in  the U.S.  are  also embracing  ACO
models.  Various  European  countries  are  experimenting  with  similar  reforms,  particularly
those  in  which  coordinated  (or  integrated)  care  from  a  network  of  providers  is  reimbursed
with bundled  payments  and/or  shared  savings.  The  challenges  for  these  reforms  remain
formidable  and  include:  (1)  overcoming  incentives  for  ACOs  to engage  in rationing  and
denial  of care  and  taking  on  too  much  ﬁnancial  risk,  (2)  collecting  meaningful  data  that
capture  quality  and  enable  rewarding  quality  improvement  and  not  just  volume  reduc-
tion, (3)  creating  incentives  for ACOs  that  do  not  accept  much  risk  to engage  in  prevention
and  health  promotion,  and  (4) creating  effective  governance  and  IT  structures  that  are
patient-centered  and  integrate  care.
©  2014  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).. Introduction
A historically fragmented system of health care deliv-
ry in the U.S. where care has been delivered by multiple
roviders with little or no coordination has, in part, led to
ver increasing issues with access, cost, and quality [1].
he Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, included
rovisions to use Medicare, the U.S. near universal public
overage program for older adults, to broadly implement
ccountable Care Organization (ACO) models with a triple
∗ Corresponding author at: 830 E Main St, 4th Floor Richmond, VA
3221, USA. Tel.: +1 804 827 4367.
E-mail address: Abarnes3@vcu.edu (A.J. Barnes).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.07.019
168-8510/© 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CCaim of improving the experience of care, the health of popu-
lations, and reducing per capita costs [2]. Private payers
have followed the Medicare ACO initiatives by initiating
their own ACO models [3,4]. The ACOs are widely seen as
the main instrument in the ACA to reign in health care
expenditures, which stood at 17.7% of GDP in 2011, com-
pared to 11.9% in second-placed Netherlands and 11.6% in
third-placed France [5]. The success of the ACOs is thus
the key to the success of the overall U.S. health reform
effort. But what makes ACOs different from other attempts
to improve health care performance in the U.S. and Europe,
and can they deliver on their promise? This article provides
a general, explanatory overview of ACOs in the U.S. and par-
allel developments in Europe, describes the current state
of ACOs in the U.S. and what makes them different from
 BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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previous payment and health care delivery reform efforts,
and concludes with an outlook on the future of ACOs and
the challenges that may  lie ahead.
2. What are ACOs?
There exist manifold deﬁnitions of what constitutes a
private ACO. On the public side, Medicare ACOs are “groups
of doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers, who
come together voluntarily to give coordinated high qual-
ity care to the Medicare patients they serve” [6]. Beyond
this, ACOs are organizations that assume ﬁnancial respon-
sibility and clinical accountability for the care provided to
a deﬁned patient population, where their accountability
extends beyond organizational boundaries. Medicare ACOs
typically have a minimum of 5000 Medicare beneﬁciaries
assigned to them by CMS  for at least 3 years. Beneﬁciary
assignment is retrospective. ACO’s may  include a variety
of provider organizations such large health systems, hos-
pitals, physician groups (with or without hospitals), or
insurers. While ACOs do not have to provide services along
a continuum of care, for Medicare ACOs, primary care is
used for attributing lives to the ACO. The ACO is respon-
sible for the total cost of care, whether the ACO directly
provides it or not [7].
For ACOs to effectively control costs and improve
experiences with care and population health, several
capabilities or competencies are key. First, a formal
legal structure and capable governance should be in
place to overcome fragmentation, to reward providers
for achieving quality and cost benchmarks, and to fos-
ter physician–hospital cooperation. Second, ACOs should
link providers along the care continuum, i.e., primary care,
specialist, inpatient, post-acute, and outpatient providers.
Third, Health Information Technology (HIT) capability
should facilitate effective care coordination and disease
management and assist with monitoring, analyzing, and
reporting quality and cost data to track patient across
providers and to improve population health [8–10]. Finally,
structures should be in place to negotiate and manage new
types of contracts, such as shared savings and/or bundled
payment models, with multiple payers. Importantly, the
current concept of ACOs is both ﬂexible and vague with
regard to payments methods, contractual arrangements
and participating organizations, which leaves substantial
conceptual latitude for those initiating them. The next
sections describe the various programs that are currently
being rolled out under Medicare and in the private insur-
ance market.
2.1. Medicare ACO programs
Existing Medicare ACO models include the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (MSSP), the Advanced Payment
Model, and the Pioneer ACO Program (Table 1). Under the
MSSP established by the Affordable Care Act, ACOs are
meant to catalyze value-based approaches to health care
[11]. In the MSSP, ACOs receive ﬁnancial rewards for con-
trolling costs while improving care delivery. There are two
MSSP models that differ in whether ACOs share only sav-
ings (one-sided model) with the Centers for Medicare andicy 118 (2014) 1–7
Medicaid Services (CMS) or agree to a larger share of sav-
ings in exchange for sharing losses (two-sided model). To
determine an individual ACO’s share of savings (or losses),
the MSSP calculates initial benchmark costs based on per
capita Medicare inpatient and outpatient expenditures on
beneﬁciaries assigned to the ACO averaged over 3 years
prior the ACO’s formation [12]. The benchmark costs are
updated annually based on overall Medicare cost growths.
They are not, however, updated based on achieving savings
during the years of program participation. ACOs share the
savings between expenditures in the benchmark year and
in each of three performance years—up to 50% in the one-
sided and 60% in the two-sided model based on meeting
quality targets [13].
In order to share in savings with CMS, ACOs must meet
quality performance standards each performance year in
four key domains: (1) patient/caregiver experiences (7
measures), (2) care coordination/patient safety (6 meas-
ures), (3) preventive health (8 measures), and (4) at-risk
populations including diabetes (2 measures), hyperten-
sion (1 measure), ischemic vascular disease (2 measures),
heart failure (1 measure), and coronary artery disease (2
measures) (Appendix 1) [14]. Over the 3 year implementa-
tion, CMS  payment shifts from ACOs simply reporting these
measures to bearing risk for meeting performance targets
on them.
While the MSSP is the most common type of Medicare
ACO program, in response to the continuum of provider
organization preparedness to participate, two other mod-
els were created—Advance Savings Model (ASM) and
Pioneer ACO. The ASMs were designed by CMS  for smaller
or more rural ACOs that lack the infrastructure to partic-
ipate in the typical MSSP. These organizations receive an
advance on expected savings with CMS  recouping advance-
ment costs from future shared savings. In contrast, the
Pioneer ACO demonstration program started in 2012 for
mostly hospital-led systems that already had some of the
ACO capabilities in place [8]. The Pioneer ACO program
intended to move these provider organizations quickly
along the path of ACO development from some to full
risk-bearing [11]. The Pioneer model is similar to the “Alter-
native Quality Contract” model that seven providers in
Massachusetts entered into with Blue Cross Blue Shield in
2009 [15].
From the beneﬁciary’s perspective, care will be coor-
dinated and providers will be compensated for providing
better care. Medicare recipients whose doctor has decided
to participate in an ACO will be notiﬁed in person or by
letter. Patients are expected to beneﬁt by ﬁlling out less
medical history paper work and fewer repeated medical
tests due to electronic health records. However, Medicare
ACOs cannot oblige patients to only visit certain health care
providers [16].
2.2. Private ACO programs
National and regional private insurers started piloting
ACO partnerships with select providers with goals to move
away from fee-for-service to value-based contracting and
to increase coordination of care along the continuum. Mod-
els with varying levels of risk-bearing are being tested and
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Table  1
Medicare ACO models as of May  2014a.
Medicare shared savings program Advanced savings
model
One-sided Two-sided
Number of
ACOs
333 (72%) 5 (7%) 36 (11%)
Beneﬁciaries 4.9 million in 47 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico
Key  features Share up to 50%
of savings
Share up to 60%
of savings and
share losses
For physician-based and rural ACOs. Each ACO receives
advances on the shared savings they are expected to earn:
• An upfront, ﬁxed payment
• An upfront, variable payment based on the number of its
historically assigned beneﬁciaries
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an range from contracting incentives to full capitation.
ational and regional insurers that organize providers and
ear the burden of assuring accountable care are catego-
ized as insurer ACOs [17]. Insurer ACOs are those that
re initiated by a private insurer. However, once initiated,
roviders, not insurers, will run the ACO. Some private
nsurers allow providers to test out new clinical models
ith some elements of fundholding before adopting the
MS’s models [18]. The risk-bearing and services may  be
hared by the private insurer and the provider as equal
artners and these can be categorized as insurer–provider
COs. Provider driven private ACOs are represented by
ither single integrated delivery systems or by a partner-
hip of multiple providers, usually hospitals and physician
rganizations. Provider private ACOs take responsibility for
ccountable populations, and the role of insurers is gener-
lly limited to a risk-based payment [17].
As providers commit to new ways of reimbursement
nd delivering care for private and public payers, both
edicare and private ACO models will inﬂuence how ACOs
evelop and affect costs, experiences with care, and health
n the U.S. For example, while federally backed ACOs drive
he ACO formation in the country, private ACOs have the
exibility to experiment with different models of deliv-
ry and payment [17]. As no dominant ACO model exists,
e can expect a further innovation in the U.S. health care
elivery system.
.3. Parallel developments in Europe
The American ACO concept combines provider payment
nd delivery reforms rather than tackling them separately.
imilarly, various European countries are also adopting this
pproach, particularly those in which coordinated (or inte-
rated) care from a network of providers is reimbursed
ith bundled payments and/or shared savings. Yet there
re notable differences, examples include the following.
n the Netherlands, health insurers can negotiate a bun-
led payment to a so-called care group for certain chronic
iseases such as diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary
isease, and vascular risk management. The care group,
lmost exclusively GPs, then subcontracts with providers
uch as other GPs, laboratories, dietitians, and specialists
19].
More recently, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs)
ave replaced primary care trusts as the commissionersA  monthly payment based on the number of its historically
assigned beneﬁciaries
t/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/All-Starts-MSSP-ACO.pdf〉.
of most NHS-funded services in the UK. The CCGs admin-
ister around two-thirds of the NHS budget and by law
have to support quality improvement in general practice.
All GPs are now legally obliged to join a CCG and are
intended to have a greater role in the purchasing of health
services and meeting local health care needs. The range
of care includes elective hospital care, rehabilitation care,
urgent and emergency care, most community health ser-
vices, mental health, and learning disability services [20].
In Germany, integrated care was fostered through var-
ious reform acts since the 2000s, which aimed to improve
cooperation between ambulatory physicians and hospitals.
However, these initiatives are coordinated by the sickness
funds, not the providers, cover only episodes of care, and
mostly take place within the existing payment structures
[21]. More akin to the ACO concept is Gesundes Kinzig-
tal (“Healthy Kinzigtal”), centered in Southwest Germany,
which covers 31,000 people for the full range of care.
Gesundes Kinzigtal is a regional health management com-
pany that has a shared savings contract with two sickness
funds and which subcontracts integrated care in coopera-
tion with the physicians’ network in the region, although
payments still come from the sickness funds. Similar to
one-sided MSSPs in Medicare, the company does not share
in losses but is rewarded for savings [22].
3. Current state of ACOs in the States
The number of ACOs has been growing strongly since
2010 (Fig. 1) [23]. In 2014, there were 338 ACOs in the
country serving nearly 5 million (>10%) Medicare beneﬁci-
aries (up from 150 ACOs, and 2.4 million (6%) beneﬁciaries
in 2011) [24,25]. When private (or non-CMS) ACOs are
included, the numbers of these organizations exceeded 400
in 2013, covering approximately 14% of Americans [4,24].
The majority of ACOs are located in larger metropolitan
areas, with the most populous states – California, Florida
and Texas – having 30 or more ACOs each. The south-
ern and Appalachia regions of the country have the most
limited ACO activity. While different entities can sponsor
an ACO, between 2010 and 2012, hospital systems were the
predominant sponsoring entity, i.e. a primary legal organi-
zation creating an ACO [17]. However, in 2013, physician
led groups have surpassed hospitals as being the most
common sponsoring entity, accounting for 51% of all ACOs
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[4,26]. A small numbers of ACOs are led by insurers and
community based organizations.
Why  do these providers choose to participate in an
ACO rather than rely on traditional Medicare payments?
Providers may  already have the requisite competencies
in place (e.g. quality reporting, IT solutions for integrated
care) to manage their services more efﬁciently, utilize syn-
ergy effects, and reach economies of scale to achieve ACO
goals. Furthermore, providers may  choose to adopt the ACO
model because they expect declining traditional Medicare
reimbursement.
To date, insufﬁcient data on ACO performance pre-
clude forming conclusions on whether ACOs will improve
quality and contain costs. The CMS-sponsored physician
group practice demonstration programs have provided
mixed results from early empirical analysis, reporting some
improvements in quality, but with no or only moder-
ate cost containment [27,28]. Pioneer ACOs and Advance
Payment ACOs had too short a track record to evaluate
effects on quality of care and costs. In July of 2013, nine
Pioneer ACOs, nearly one-third, dropped out of the pro-
gram after the ﬁrst year with seven of these converting
to the MSSP program where they would bear less ﬁnan-
cial risk [29]. However, the Alternative Quality Contract
model in Massachusetts after 2 years led to savings of 1.9%
in the ﬁrst year and 3.3% in the second year achieved by
lower prices and reduced utilization. Quality of care, par-
ticularly chronic disease management and preventive care,
also improved [15]. But, when the costs of administering
the program, including bonus payments to providers, were
considered, the total cost of health care in the Alterna-
tive Contract Quality model likely increased. Analyses of
ACO pilots suggest that collaboration, shared values and
aims among participating organizations, and market and
regulatory issues were important for development of ACO
structures and capabilities to deliver accountable care to in 2014:  A Look Ahead. He alth Aff airs
rganizations by Sponsoring Entity 2010–2013.
patients [30]. However, this work was  limited in scope and
did not systematically assess external or contextual factors
conducive to ACO development.
4. What makes ACOs different?
Although ACOs are relatively new, certain concepts and
features appear to be related to those that are already
in practice in organizations such as Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs), and in performance improvement
programs such as pay-for-performance (P4P) and patient-
centered medical homes (PCMHs) (Table 2) [31]. HMOs
are a type of managed care organization (MCO) which
emerged in the U.S. in the 1980s. With the goal of lowering
costs while improving quality, MCOs integrate the insur-
ing of patients with managing their health care. Provider
groups contract with MCOs to care for MCO  patients. Care
is typically managed through the use of practice guide-
lines, prevention, and disease management (an integration
of care for complex and chronic diseases). HMOs are the
strongest form of managed care, in that they require
patients to stay within the provider network and they
incentivize providers to reduce unnecessary care through
reimbursements and other mechanisms. Reimbursement
mechanisms include capitation (paying a ﬁxed amount per
patient for the patient’s care), bonuses, and withholds.
HMOs grew for nearly two decades, and appear to have
contributed to lowering health care utilization and costs
[32]. However, providers and patients objected to the reim-
bursement and management mechanisms, which many
claim led to too much provider ﬁnancial risk and cases
of denial of care. Over time HMOs gave way  to Preferred
Provider Organizations, and other less strict forms of man-
aged care [33].
Certain ACO features are similar to the HMO model.
U.S. ACOs in the Medicare program control costs through
A.J. Barnes et al. / Health Policy 118 (2014) 1–7 5
Table  2
What makes ACOs different?
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs)
Similarities Differences Lessons to learn
Managed Care
Organizations
(MCOs)
• Providers have an incentive to
reduce unnecessary care
•  Costs are controlled through
ﬁnancial incentives such as
bundling of charges and shared
savings
•  Integration of care could lead to
market power and higher prices
• MCOs combine the insuring of patients with
managing their health care; ACOs manage and
provide care but do not take on the insurance
function
• Provider groups contract with MCOs to care
for MCO patients; ACOs are predominantly
organized by providers, not insurers
• MCOs require patients to stay within the
provider network; ACOs do not
• Providers may  carry more ﬁnancial risk with
MCOs than with ACOs
• MCO  ﬁnancial incentives are focused on
reducing utilization while ACO focus is on
improving quality.
• Managing care can control costs
but the HMO  backlash resulted
from providers bearing too much
ﬁnancial risk and patients
experiencing strict management
leading to denial of care
Pay  for
Performance
(P4P)
• Provider payments are tied to
meeting quality targets
• No differences • Limited evidence that P4P works
• Providers may “teach to the test”
by focusing on outcomes that are
rewarded at the expense of other
important inputs to improving
quality of care
Patient-
Centered
• An aim is to provide integrated
care
• ACOs build in ﬁnancial incentives to
coordinate care; PCMHs do not
ve an e
n their c
goal.
• Early evidence suggests
patient-centered care, care
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PCMHs ha
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have this 
undling of charges and “shared savings”, which come from
ither bonuses, or withholds with bonuses for good per-
ormance [12,33]. Costs are also expected to be reduced
hrough improved integration of care which will better
anage patients with chronic diseases [31]. Features of
he current British CCGs described above are also similar to
MOs. General Practitioners work within a commissioning
udget, and the GPs have responsibility for a range of care
or a group of patients. This arrangement is similar to the
apitated provider budgets in HMOs [34].
However, ACOs differ from HMOs in several respects.
irst, in Medicare ACOs patients can go to providers out-
ide of their networks [29]. This is an important distinction
hat may  help with patient acceptance of ACOs. Second,
roviders in ACOs, particularly in the predominant Medi-
are ACO models, do not bear nearly as much ﬁnancial risk
s provider groups in HMOs, which carried up to 100% of
he risk if under global capitation arrangements [35,36].
his may  change, and ACOs may  bear more risk as their
se expands and as the private insurance industry takes
p the model. Third, ACOs are formed by provider groups
hat have a direct interest in improving performance and
eceiving ﬁnancial rewards for this, whereas under HMOs
erformance improvement is mandated from the HMO  and
roviders must share the ﬁnancial rewards with the HMO
33,37]. Fourth, ACOs are more truly integrated compared
o HMOs [31,38]. ACO integration is accomplished through
rganizational structure and through sharing of electronic
ecords, neither of which were common with HMOs. Fifth,
here is now more information about how to manage care
han there was in the early days of HMOs [33,38]. ACOs can
ake advantage of health care guidelines, quality metrics
nd knowledge about patient costs. Finally, there is an
ncreased emphasis on measurable outcomes, which willxplicit goal to involve
are; ACOs do not necessarily
coordination and integration
improves care experiences and
health
help ACOs reach performance goals and benchmark their
performance.
ACOs also borrow from the P4P and PCMH con-
cepts. P4P reimburses health care providers differentially
based on whether they meet quality targets. ACO quality-
improvement mechanisms are similar to these P4P
programs that reward ACOs for providing high quality
care [31]. PCMHs aim to provide patient centered care
and reduce the fragmentation of care. In PCMHs patients
are involved in their care, and they have an ongoing rela-
tionship with a primary care provider who coordinates
their care across all providers and health care settings
and through all life stages [39]. ACOs’ focus on integration
of care is borrowed from PCMH concepts of coordinating
patient care [31,35]. However, while ACOs build in ﬁnan-
cial incentives to coordinate care, PCMHs do not. Another
difference is that one of the goals of PCMHs is to involve
patients in their care whereas ACOs do not explicitly have
this goal [40].
Adoption of P4P, may  not be advantageous. So far, P4P
has not been shown to signiﬁcantly improve care or lower
costs, so the value of this ACO feature is questionable
[41–44]. On the other hand, ACOs may  want to emulate
PCMHs, as the positive effect of patient-centered care, care
coordination and integration is starting to become evident.
Although PCMHs have only been around for a few years
they have so far had mostly positive reviews [45,46].
Will ACOs be able to take the best from these prior
efforts and avoid the pitfalls? The “shared savings” features
of ACOs provide incentives to keep unnecessary utiliza-
tion down, and could therefore lower costs. However, like
its HMO  counterpart, shared savings could also lead to
denial of needed care, especially if reimbursement evolves
into capitation. ACOs might also eventually carry too much
ealth Pol
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ﬁnancial risk. A high amount of ﬁnancial risk could neg-
atively affect the quality of care through organizational
instabilities and insolvencies [31,37]. The ongoing chal-
lenge for ACOs is to not cross the line that leads to denial of
needed care and ﬁnancial instability. Unlike HMOs, the fact
that ACOs are organized by providers themselves rather
than managed care companies affords providers better
control over their reimbursements and guidelines of care.
Further, ACO integration of care may  reduce unnecessary
utilization, but highly integrated systems could lead to
greater consolidation of providers [7,35,40]. This could lead
to a high degree of market power, and with that, higher
prices.
5. Outlook
ACOs are a successor in a long line of health care per-
formance improvement programs in the U.S. [47]. Starting
with HMOs and managed care in the 1980s, and going
through a series of CMS  reimbursement reforms and the
implementation of health savings accounts and health
information technology, these programs have, so far, not
succeeded in improving health care delivery for a sustained
period of time [47]. What would make ACOs more success-
ful than their predecessors (and programs from which it has
borrowed features)? Are ACOs a radical enough departure
that they will instigate breakthroughs in costs and qual-
ity or are they just another in a series of policies that fail
to make lasting improvements in quality or get spending
under control? Such questions are vital to answer for ACOs
to have the potential to reform care delivery and payment
models in the U.S.
The challenges for ACOs are formidable, are not exclu-
sive to ACOs, and include: (1) overcoming incentives for
ACOs to engage in rationing and denial of care and tak-
ing on too much ﬁnancial risk, (2) collecting meaningful
data that capture quality and enable rewarding quality
improvement and not just volume reduction, (3) creating
incentives for ACOs that do not accept much risk to engage
in prevention and health promotion, and (4) creating effec-
tive governance and IT structures that are patient-centered
and integrate care. Ongoing monitoring, evaluating, and
reshaping of the payment and delivery reforms targeted
by ACOs will be key to their success in achieving the triple
aim of improving experiences of care and the health of
populations while containing costs.
Furthermore, in our opinion, a word of caution is
needed. ACOs should not be expected to make large
improvements in health care performance. ACOs are on the
“sharp,” or distal, end of population health and health care
expenditures. At the proximal end of population health are
socio-economic factors such as environment, community,
conditions of employment (or unemployment), income,
and food supply [48]. The ACO model, indeed the U.S.
health care system, is not designed to substantively inﬂu-
ence these social determinants of health. ACOs may  lower
costs marginally, but expenditures will remain high unless
the high demand for acute medical care and the unit price
of care, in the US is tackled [49]. To make substantive and
lasting improvements in health and health care costs, much
more is needed than the creation of ACOs.
[icy 118 (2014) 1–7
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.healthpol.2014.07.019.
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